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1. INTRODUCTION 
The desire to acquire economically valuable information provides a powerful explanation 
for  many empirically observed economic  phenomena.  Two  examples which have been 
extensively studied by economists are investment in " human capital " through education 
and expenditures on research  and development.  In these examples, information is explicitly 
purchased.  In economic contexts where individuals and firms learn from experience, the 
demand for information may be manifested in other ways.  One such example, arises when 
new and untested products such as new drugs are introduced to the market.  It is plausible 
to  hypothesize that consumers confronted with  new products experiment with them to 
gain  information.  The  demand for  experimental consumption  might  be  expected  to 
increase total demand for new products over what it otherwise would be. 
Firms  which  enter new  and  unfamiliar markets may  also  learn from  experience. 
Indeed, firms facing unknown demand curves will often find it profitable to experiment with 
price in  an effort to  improve the information acquired through experience.  The exact 
nature of the effect which firm experimentation has on observed prices and supplies would 
appear to be less predictable than the consumer response to new products, however. 
This paper analyses the phenomena of learning and experimentation in the context of 
a dynamic economic model which incorporates a Bayesian expectation-revision  mechanism. 
In this model, the individual (or firm) responds to new information as it is received, but he 
is  not passive about the information he obtains.  Indeed, he recognizes that his future 
expectations, and therefore his future decisions, will depend on the information which is 
acquired by observing the consequences of his present actions.  He is also aware that the 
quality of information acquired from experience may be affected by the specific course of 
action followed in the present.  In this model, individuals find it profitable to modify their 
behaviour as a means of improving the information on which future decisions are based. 
In deciding exactly how much experimentation to engage in, individuals weigh the benefits 
from more informed future decisions against the costs incurred because present experi- 
mental actions differ from those which would be optimal if learning from experience did 
not occur. 
The model is first interpreted  as a description of the situation faced by a consumer who 
buys, in addition to other goods, a drug of unknown reliability.  If the consumer's health is 
affected by random factors as well as by the drug, his experience with the drug provides less 
than completely dependable, i.e. " noisy ", information about its reliability.  In this model, 
the  consumer's drug purchases reflect a  desire to  learn through experimentation.  We 
2M-44/3  533 534  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC STUDIES 
formulate a dynamic model to analyse the effects of experimentation on the amount of the 
drug consumed.  The consumer is assumed to maximize the present value of the expected 
utility derived from consumption of the drug and other goods.  The formal mechanism 
by which the information acquired through experimentation is assimilated is Bayes' Rule. 
It is shown that, when drug consumption affects health through a linear regression 
equation,  the  possibility  of  learning from experience induces experimentation which in 
turn causes the consumer to buy more of the drug than he would if no learning took place, 
other things being equal.  This result generalizes to a broader class of probability distri- 
butions a result obtained earlier by Prescott [13]. 
The final section of the paper reinterprets  the model and our conclusions to analyse the 
effects of experimentation by monopolists who are attempting to learn their demand curve. 
The idea that learning from experience affects economic behaviour has been investi- 
gated by Arrow [1].  Arrow assumes that over time firms accumulate experience which 
increases productivity.  His paper is not, however, founded on a formal statistical model of 
the information generating process which results in " learning by  doing".  The present 
paper can be interpreted as providing a model of this process. 
This paper can also be viewed as a complement to the papers of Kihlstrom [9],  [10] 
which study the demand for information about product quality on the part of Bayesian 
consumers.  In Kihlstrom's work information is actually purchased in markets which exist 
for the explicit purpose of selling information;  consumers do not experiment to learn about 
product quality.  In the model studied here, information demand arises in an implicit form 
and it is  satisfied by the consumer himself when he  experiments with his consumption 
choices. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
Consider the idealized problem of a consumer who receives a stationary income over time 
and uses it in each period to buy two goods, one of which is a drug of unknown quality. 
The other good can be interpreted as a composite good which provides fixed proportions 
of all other commodities. 
We let 
Yt  = drug consumption in period t, 
and 
xt = consumption of the other good in period t. 
The consumer's periodic income is I>0.  Prices are normalized so that the price per 
unit of the composite good is 1.  The per unit price of the drug is p-> 0. 
The fact that drug quality is unknown is assumed to imply that the consumer views 
the effect of drug consumption on health as a random, but non-cumulative relationship. 
Specifically, it is assumed that health in period t can be measured by a variable zt which is 
related to drug consumption in period t by the linear equation 
2t = a +  lRYt  +9t 
where {et} is a sequence of intertemporarily independent and unobserved normal random 
variables each, with mean zero, and variance one.  (In this equation, as in the remainder 
of the paper, random variables are denoted by a ".. ".)  This specification implies that 
random variations in health are unrelated to drug intake and occur even if the consumer 
abstains from drug use.  Without drug use, health is measured by cx  +  t which is a normal 
random variable with mean cx  and variance 1.  It is plausible to assume that the consumer 
knows the distribution of health when no drugs are used.  Thus he is assumed to know his 
" average health"  parameter a and the variance of st which, for convenience, we assume 
to be 1. 
The parameter  f,  is the contribution of each unit of drug consumption to health.  This 
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true  value  of fi  which  change  from  period  to period  as experience  with  the drug  accumulates. 
These  beliefs  are assumed  to be represented  by a probability  distribution,  which  is revised 
in each period as information  is received. We assume  that there are n numbers  which 
could  possibly  be the true  value  of fi.  That  is, there  exists  a set {f1, fl2,  ...,  fl&}  of possible  fi 
values  each of which  has positive  probability  in the " prior  " probability  distribution  that 
represents  the consumer's  initial  beliefs. This assumption  is made  strictly  for expositional 
convenience. The results  obtained  hold for a more general  class of prior  measures  which 
are concentrated  on a compact set.  We will return  to this point several  times in the 
exposition  which  follows. 
It is hypothesized  that the consumer  behaves  as though  he were  a Bayesian  statistician 
who uses Bayes'  Rule to revise  his expectations  when new information  is received. If the 
consumer  buys  yi units  of the drug  in period  i and observes  a health  level  zi in that period, 
then his experience  in period  i is summarized  by the vector wi =  (zr, yi).  If we let  ft  be 
the probability  that fl = f3i  given  the information  available  at time t, and let 
ftJ2  ..  (f  fnDi 
then  ft  is the posterior  mass function  which  represents  the consumer's  beliefs  in period  t, 
before  the random  vector  w-t  is observed. The posteriorft reflects  his previous  experience 
as well as the a-priori  mass  functionf0 which  describes  his initial  beliefs  about  drug  quality. 
We let gt be the function  (implied  by Bayes'  Rule)  which  relatesft to experience  and tof?. 
The experience  acquired  up to  and including period t  is  summarized  by the vector 
wt 
=  (w0, wl,  ...,  wt).  Let zt _  (zo, zl,  ...,  zt) and yt  =(Yo'Yyl  ..., Yt).  We will some- 
times write  wt  =  (zt, yt).  The set of possible  wt vectors  is denoted  by Wt.  Thus we can 
express Bayes' Rule asft  =  gt(f0;  wt  1).  Then 
ft  g1(ft-l.;  wt1). 
In making  his drug  and  goods  purchase  decision  in each  period  the consumer  is assumed 
to  maximize expected utility.  In period t, the utility of  (xt,  zt)  is u(xt,  zt), where u is a 
strictly  concave  utility function  with positive marginal  utility of both goods.  Since the 
utility function  u is invariant  over time, the consumer's  preferences  for health and other 
goods are stationary. In spite of this stationarity,  the consumer's  preferences  for drugs 
and goods are not invariant  over time.  These  preferences  are represented  by an expected 
utility function that varies with beliefs formed on the basis of experience. In period t, 
this expected  utility  function  is 
U(xt, Yt ift) =  _1 Ju(xt,  a + ,iyt + st)h(st I  O)ftdst 
= J'u(xt, zt)m(zt I  f t; yt)dzt,  ... (1) 
where  h(. I 4u)  is the normal  density  function  with mean  p and variance  1 and m(  Ift; Yt) 
is the predictive  density  defined  by 
m(zt  I  ft;  Yt) = 
n 
h(zt I  o+Ijyt)f/. 
At the beginning of period t the consumer has observed some realization of w  1, say 
w  1.  Given  this information  he makes  a decision  about  how much  xt and  Yt to consume. 
Each  period  the consumer  faces the budget  constraint 
PYt+Xt  =I,  ...(2) 
where  p and I are respectively  the (positive)  price of drugs  and the consumer's  (positive) 
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In each period t, the consumer can, therefore, be viewed as choosing Yt, and setting 
Xt =  I-PYt.  The Yt level chosen must, of course, satisfy the restriction 
0 < Yt  < (/p).  ...(3) 
In addition, the Yt  choice will be influenced by wt  1, the experience accumulated to time t. 
Expected utility at time t,  U(I-Pyt,  Yt I  ft)  is influenced by current beliefs as repre- 
sented by ft.  But ft  =  gt(f  '  wt  1),  where wt-  =  (zt -1, yt- 1)  This means that the 
process of information assimilation, captured in the function gt, introduces an intertemporal 
element to  the problem of  choosing  an optimal drug purchase.  Intuitively, the beliefs 
which provide the basis for preference formation in period t are arrived at by interpreting 
previously observed health levels zt-1  in  the light of  earlier drug consumption choices 
y  .  In particular, earlier drug consumption levels determine the extent to which observed 
health levels can be relied on as evidence about ,B.  The consumer's problem, then, is to 
choose  a level of drug demand which attains an optimal balance between informational 
gains that accrue later and current health gains. 
The possibilities for experimentation in this model can be made explicit if we state 
the problem in the framework of dynamic programming.  To do this let VT(f)  be defined as 
VY(f)  max  E[U(I-pyo,  Yo I  f)+  It-  1  [tU(I-PYt,  Yt  I  gt(f;  w-`))],  .*(4) 
Yo,  {Yt}t  =  1 
whereyo e [0, Ilp],  2t:  Gt-+[O,  Ilp],  Gt  {ft: ft  =  gt(f;  wt  -);  wt e Wt}  the set 
of possible posteriors.  We will give a more explicit form for (4) just before the proof of 
Lemma 2.  Lemma 3 proves that VT(f)  is well defined.  At this point, it should be noted that, 
in the definition (4), the consumer's strategy at t is a drug consumption choice yt(ft) which 
depends on his posterior at that date.  Thus in (4) yt refers to a realization of 
Yt =  Yt(gt(f;  t 1)); 
i.e. Yt =  yt(gt(f;  wt- 1)), where wt-1 is a realization of wt  It follows from (4) that, for 
T ?0, 
VT(f) =  max  {U(I-py,  y If)+E[V  (g(f,  w))]},  (5) 
O _<  y !S I/p 
and 
VT(f)  -  0  if  T  ?  0. 
In (5), we have omitted the subscript " zero " on y and z and the superscript " zero" 
on  w.  Thus in (5), w =  (z, y).  We will continue to  use the more convenient notation 
throughout the remainder  of the paper.  The expression VT(f)  is the maximum future utility 
attainable when T periods remain and consumer beliefs are represented  by f 
Note that 
E{V  [g(f,  w)]}  =  {  vTl[gl(f;  z, y)]m(z If; y)dz.  ...(6) 
Equation (6) is an expression for the expected future utility when y units of the drug are 
consumed in period zero.  In computing the expectation (6), the value  VT-l[gl(f;  z, y)] 
associated with each posterior gl(f;  z, y) is weighted by the probability m(z I  f;  y).  Define 
the function 
HT(y, f)  _ E{VT[gl(f;  w)]},  ...(7 
where it will be recalled that w =  (z, y).  Using (7), equation (5) may be rewritten as 
vT(f)  =  max  [U(I-py,  y If)+  6H(y,  f)].  ...(8 
O  _<  y ! I/p 
An " experimenting " consumer will choose y to maximize 
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A maximizer,  which may not be unique,  is denoted  by yT(f).  Lemma  3 below will 
demonstrate  that  yT(f)  exists  by establishing  that the function  in (9) is continuous. 
The experimental  design  aspects  of the consumer's  choice  problem  are apparent  in (5) 
and its alternative  expression  (9).  The first  term  in (5) and (9) measures  the present  utility 
of y units of drug consumption. The second term measures  the expected  future  utility 
of the improvements  in information  made possible  because  y was chosen.  In choosing 
yT(f)  to maximize  the sum of these  utilities  the consumer  is, as stated  above,  arriving  at an 
optimal  balance  between  present  utility  and future  information. 
As we are interested  in the effect of experimentation  on consumption  we propose  to 
investigate  the relationship  between  the (possibly  non-unique)  strategy  yT(f)  and the con- 
sumption  strategy  which  would  be optimal  if the possibilities  for learning  from experience 
are  non-existent  or ignored.  To facilitate  this  comparison  we first  study  the optimal  consump- 
tion decisions  made  by a consumer  who assumes  that  his future  beliefs  will be unchanged  by 
his current  experience. Such a consumer  will choose a sequence  of drug consumption 
levels  to solve the problem 
max El  tU(I-pyt,  Yt If)  ...(10) 
Ytt  =.I 
The solution  to this problem  is obtained  by choosing,  in each period t, the consumption 
level which  satisfies  (3) and maximizes 
U(I-PY,  Y If).  ...(11) 
The value y which maximizes  (11), is denoted by y?(f),  and is called the optimal non- 
experimental  consumption  policy.  Under our assumptions  y?(f) is unique. 
To emphasize  the difference  between  y?(f) and  yT(f)  recall  that, from  (9), the function 
which  yT(f)  maximizes  is a sum of two terms. The first  term  represents  expected  current 
utility,  while  the second  term  measures  the extent  to which  learning  from  current  experience 
enables  the consumer  to increase  his utility by making  more informed  future decisions. 
If we compare  (9) with (11), it is seen  that (11) is the first  term  in (9), i.e. (11) is the current 
expected  utility  of consumption. Thus  y?(f), unlike  yT(f),  is chosen  without  regard  to the 
effects  of learning  from experience. 
Since  zt observations  provide  information  about  ,  when  Yt  is positive,  the  consumer  can, 
in essence, produce  information  by consuming  drugs.  The " amount  " of information 
he produces  will depend  on the amount  of drugs  he consumes. This relationship  between 
information  and drug consumption  can be interpreted  as a technology  for information 
production  in which  the " input  " is Yt. The " output  " (measured  in expected  utility  terms) 
can be interpreted  as 3HT(y, f).  Of course  an experimenting  consumer  who avails  himself 
of this technology  pays a price. Indeed,  one can think of the cost of the information  pro- 
vided  by y as C(y,  f),  where 
C(y, f)  U[-PA(,  yf  If]-U(I-py,  y If) 
C(y,  f)  > 0 because  y?(f) maximizes  (11).  C(y,  f) gives  the one-period  cost of choosing  a 
drug  consumption  which  is designed  to give more  future  information  about  fi  than  the drug 
consumption  which  is non-experimentally  optimal  provides. 
We can now prove that the possibility  of experimentation  causes  consumers  to buy 
more of the drug  than they  would  otherwise; i.e. yT(f)  >  yl(f).  (Since  yT(f)  may  not be 
unique,  we must show that this inequality  holds for all yT(f)  which maximize  (9).)  We 
prove  this by showing  that the inequality  holds  precisely  because  larger  drug  consumptions 
lead  to more  " informative  " experiments  in the sense  of Blackwell  [2].  (In  Blackwell's  termi- 
nology, observation  of the consumer's  health  level when a large amount  of the drug  has 
been  consumed  is an experiment  which  is sufficient  for the observation  of health  when  small 
amounts  of the drug have been used.)  The most complicated  part of the proof involves 
showing  that this fact implies  that HT(y, f)  is an increasing  function of y-Theorem  1. 
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These  theorems  and their  proofs  use the notation  appropriate  to the case in which  the 
prior  measure  is finite-discrete,  i.e. concentrated  on a finite  number  of possible  values. As 
mentioned  earlier  the proofs of these theorems  can be extended  to a more  general  class of 
cases in which  the support  of the prior  is contained  in a compact  set. 
Theorem  1.  HT(y, f)  is a non-decreasing  function  of y for each  f.  We defer  the proof 
of Theorem  1 until later. 
Theorem  2.  Assume  that  f  u(I, a + /iIl/p + e)h(e  I  O)de<  oo,  for i =  1, 2, ..., n.  Also 
suppose that a yT(f)  exists.  Then  yT(f)  >  yo(f). 
Proof.  The  Lebesgue dominated convergence  theorem implies that  U(x, y If), 
defined  in (1), is a continuous  function  of (x, y) for all (x, y) such that  py+x  ?  I, since 
u(x,  x+fliy+s)  < u(I, oc+flaI/p+e)  for all  i =  1, 2, ...,  n. 
Therefore  U(I-py,  y If) is a continuous  function  of y for 0 < y ?  I/p.  Thus  a maximizer 
of ( 1) exists. The  maximizer  is unique  for eachfbecause  u(x, y) is assumed  strictly  concave 
in (x, y).  Hence  y0(f) is well defined. 
Suppose  a yT(f)  exists such  that  yT(f) <yO(f).  Since  y?(f) is uniquely  maximal 
U[I-pyT(f),  yT(f)  If]  <  U[I-py0(f),  YO(f)  If].  ... (12) 
By Theorem  1 
H  T[yO(f),  f]  >  HT[yT(f),  f].  ... (13) 
Adding  (12) and (13) implies 
U[I-py"T(f),  yT(f)  I  f]  +  6HT[yT(f),  f]  <  U[I-pyl(f)  I  f]  +  6HT(y0(f),  f).  ..  .(14) 
But (14) contradicts  the assumption  that  yT(f)  is a maximizer  of 
U(I-py,  y If)+H  T(y, f).  11 
Theorem  1 is the key to Theorem  2.  Theorem  1 states  that more  valuable  information 
is provided  by larger  drug  consumptions. The proof of this result  is based  on Blackwell's 
approach  to the comparison  of experiments,  which  we now digress  to discuss. In the course 
of this discussion,  we will make  clear  the formal  meaning  of the term  " more  informative" 
which  has been used informally  up to here. 
As in the previous  discussion,  h(z I  a +fly) is a normal  density  function  of z with  mean 
c.  +fly and variance  1.  Define 
k(z I  ,B,  y)_  h(z j  fly).  ...(15) 
Let F  -[k(-  I  *,  y)l y E R].  F is called a family of experiments. (If k e F, k' e F, then 
k =  k' if and only if k =  (z  l  P, y) =  h(z  ax+fly),  k' =  (z I  fl, y') = h(z I  +fly')  and y = y'.) 
An experiment  k is sufficient  for an experiment  k', if there  exists  a function  v(z' I  z) > 0 such 
that for all z' and all ,B 
00 
k(z' 1  P,  y')  =  v(z' I  z)k(z j /,  y)dz,  ..4.(16) 
- 00 
and for all z 
00 
{v(z'  I  z)dz'=  1.  ... (17) 
J-co 
Note that v(z' I  z) must not depend  on  ,.  To interpret  this definition  one might  envisage 
an experimental  apparatus  k which yields observations  z.  Since the distributions  of z 
and z' depends  on  ,B, k or k' can be used to learn about  f,.  When (16) and (17) hold an 
observer  who only has access to the apparatus  k can reproduce  the apparatus  k' using 
v(*  I  .).  This can be done as follows.  If the apparatus  k yields  an observation  z, then draw GROSSMAN,  KIHLSTROM  & MIRMAN  LEARNING INFORMATION  539 
an observation  z' from an urn for which  the density  of z' is given  by v(z' I  z).  If this pro- 
cedure  is followed,  then  z' will have  a density  given  by h(z' I  /3, y') which  is exactly  what  the 
apparatus  k' would  have  yielded. Note that v(z' I  z) must  not depend  on /3.  If it does, the 
observer  who does not know  /  cannot construct  the urn.  We will sometimes  refer  to k 
as more  informative  -than  k' if k is sufficient  for k'.  See De Groot  [5, p. 433] and Kihlstrom 
[101 for more details  and references  to the literature  on Blackwell's  sufficiency  theory. 
In the remainder  of the paper,  comparisons  of experiments  based on sufficiency  are 
used  to determine  the  relative  value  of alternative  experiments.  In Theorem  3, which  follows, 
it is shown that if one experiment  k is more informative  than another  k', then k is more 
valuable  to observers  than k'. 
As  a preliminary  to  this theorem let il  be a  real valued function with domain 
{OD  ...  /3#} x A.  The set A is interpreted as a set of possible decisions.  A generic element 
of A is denoted  by (. 
Now let 
V*(f)  sup  (  ii(/3(,  OAf  .  (18) 
As above,  CeA 
gl[f;  (z, y)]  E  fik(z I pi, y)  ...(19) 
and  >~~~~i[f 
z  Y  i 
jJ>fk(z  I  /.,'  y)  and 
g~{f; (z', ~)]  fik(z'  I  /3i, y')  9 i Uf; (zt  ") _ 
fi(fkAs  ,)-  ... (20) 
=l 
' 
fjk(z'  I  fl,y')'..  () 
wherefi is the prior  probability  that  P3i  is the true  value of ,B. The vector 
g1[f;  (Z,  y)]  =  {gi[f;  (Z,  Y)],  ...  gn[f;  (Z,  Y)]} 
is the posterior  mass function  that results  when experiment  k is run and z is observed. 
The mass function  gl[f;  (z', y')] is similarly  defined. 
Theorem  3.  If k is sufficient  for k', then 
where  EV*{gl[f;  (z, y)]}  ? EV*{gl[f;  (z', y')]}, 
EV*{gl[f;  (z, Y)]} = J  y *{gl[f;  (z, y)]}  n 
1 h(z I  /3i, y)fidz 
- 00 
and 
EV*{gl[f; (z', y')]} =  V*{gl[f;  (z,  y')]}  i  n h(z' I  p3i, y')fidz'. 
Theorem  3 shows that a " more informative"  experiment  is more  valuable. That is, 
if a decision  maker's  choices  depend  on his beliefs  about  ,,  he will achieve  higher  expected 
utility  if his beliefs  are formed  on the basis of a more informative  experiment. Marschak 
and Miyasawa  [12] and Blackwell  [3] also prove  this result. 
The following  Lemma,  which  states  a result  about sufficiency  for the family  F, is used 
to prove  Theorem  1. 
Lemma 1.  If y>y'>O,  then k is sufficient  for k'. 
Proof.  From (15), k(z I  /3, y)  =  h(z I  oc+,By)  and k(z' I  /3, y') =  h(z' I  oc+,By'). Consider 
two random  variables  z and z' which  are  jointly normally  distributed  such  that 
Ez _oc +y, Ez' _  a +y', var  (z)  var  (z') =  1, 
and covariance  (z, z')  y'/y.  From elementary  normal distribution  theory, the con- 
ditional  density  of z' given  z, v*(z' I  z), is of the normal  form with mean 
E[z  I z] = Ez1  + y(z-Ez)/y  = (1 -(y'/y))  + y'z/y  .. .(21a) 540  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
and variance 
var [z' I z] = 1-(y'/y)2.  ...(21b) 
By assumption  0 <y'<y,  so var  [z' I  z] >0.  Thus the joint distribution  of (z, z') is well 
defined,  and the conditional  density  of z' given  z is independent  of ,B  by (21).  By definition 
of z and z', k is the marginal density of z and k' is the marginal density of z'.  Since the 
marginal  density  of z' is equal  to the conditional  density  of z' given  z averaged  by the density 
of z we have 
h(z' I cx+,By')  v*(z' j z)h(z I  oe+#y)dz. 
- 00 
00 
Since v* is a density  of z' given z, v* >  0 and  v*(z' I  z)dz' =  1 for all z.  Therefore 
J-oo 
v*(. I) is a function  that satisfies  (16) and (17).  11 
Remark. The following  outline of an alternative  proof is suggestive  of the motivation 
for Lemma  1.  Note that, when  a is known,  observing 
Z =  a+py+6  (z' =  a+#y'+s) 
is equivalent  to observing 
r = (z-o)/y  = ,B  + (s/y)  [r' = (z'-c  )/y' =  p + (sly')] 
which  is normal  with mean  ,B  and variance  a2 =  y-2  [(a')2  =  (y')-2].  Now define r"  to 
be  a  normal random variable (independent  of  r- and F') with mean /3 and variance 
(a")2  =  {[1/a2]-[1/(a')2]}  '.  It is obvious and easy to  prove that joint  observation of 
both independent  variables  r' and r"  is sufficient  for observations  of the single  variable  r. 
It is also relatively  easy to demonstrate  that the random  variable 
*=  ,  +  (  2"][r  -  +  ] 
is sufficient  for joint observation  of r' and r".  But r* is a normal  random  variable  with 
mean  /3  and variance 
[1()2  (a")2  =  [(')2  +  -a2  (a,)2]]  = 
Thus  r* has the same  distribution  as F.  As a consequence,  observations  of r-  are sufficient 
for observations  of r*.  Since Blackwell  has demonstrated  that sufficiency  is a transitive 
relation, the experiment  " observe r " must therefore  be sufficient  for the experiment 
"observe Fr"  and k is sufficient  for k'. 
Lemma  1 states  that larger  drug  consumptions  lead to more  informative  experiments. 
More  informative  experiments  are more  valuable  by Theorem  3.  So we would  expect  that 
HT(y, f)  is increasing  in y because  HT  gives the informational  value of changes  in drug 
consumption. Lemma  2, below,  is the  key  to the proof  of this  fact.  However,  it is necessary 
to introduce  some notation in order  to specify  the consumer's  maximum  problem  (5) in 
more detail. This we now do. 
As above, we denote the range of the random variable 0',  t >  1, by  Wtl.  For 
t >  1, let yt denote  a function  with  domain  Wt- l and  range  [0, Ilp];  i.e. yt:  Wtl  -[0,  I/p]. 
Denote the set of possible  yt's  by 
F,=  {y  Wt-  l  [0,  I/p]}. 
Now let T be a finite integer,  to be interpreted  as the consumer's  horizon.  Denote any 
sequence  {y}fT  1 by yT and let FT  represent  the set of possible  yT,s;  i.e. 
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For most of the following  discussion  we will suppress  the dependence  of FT and  T on T, 
and write  F and y instead. 
Once y has been chosen, we can define new functions C,; t =  0,  ...,  T;  such that 
Co:  r,  x  [0o  I/p]  [O,  /I/p, 
and 
C,:  r1  x  R, x [0, Ilp] -+  [O, Ilp], 
where  R, is t-dimensional  Euclidean  space. 
We do this by letting 
Co(Y;  Yo) = Yo, 
MY(; Zo, Yo) = Y1(Zo,  Y'o), 
and 
Wt(Y;  zt-1  YO)  =  yt[zt-l,  ct-(y;  Zt2,  Yo)] 
where 
4t-I(y;  Zt-2,  yo)  =  [o(y;  yo),  *..  t-_l(y;  zt2,  YO)]  for  t =2,  ...,  T. 
Intuitively,  yt is a strategy  or contingency  plan for period t that specifies  the consumer's 
choice of Yt  for each " experience  vector  " wt-I which  might  possibly  be observed. Note 
that the vector  of previous  decisions  is an argument  of the function  yt.  But each previous 
decision,  except  the first,  is chosen  as a function  of previous  experience. Thus  the decision 
Yt  is ultimately  dependent  only on the previously  observed  health  levels  zt-1 and the first 
decision  yo.  Of course,  the way it depends  on these variables  is determined  by y.  The 
functions  C,  express  the functional  relationship  between  Yt  and the variables  zt- 1,  yo and y. 
If we now let At =  (zt-,  yo) for t =  1, ...,  T and  AO  = yo  then  the consumer's  problem 
is choose  yo E [0, Ilp] and a sequence  y E F to maximize  the expected  utility 
JFRTl 
= 
O  t  T 
btu[I-pCt(y;  it),  z]jf  fT- 
= 
h[z|  a+Th4(i;  AT)]dz 
RT+j 
=  St - O |  L -n  u[I-p4pC(y;  2t), zt]jf  H9  - t h[z, I  AT+)]4(y;  ,)Idzt.  ...(22) 
Rt+j 
This expected  utility  can be simplified  in a useful  way by substituting  the expression  for the 
posteriorft, when t ?  1.  Specifically, 
fit  _gi(f?;  wt1 
I  T 
=1  _  (foH-otZT 
I  LX+AYT)  t  n~~f?  H 
l- =t' h(z?,  I 
+f) 
IfyT =  YT(WT1)  for T-  1, ...,  t;  then wt  1  =  [zt-l,  t-1(y;  zt-2,  y0)],  and 
=  gi{f0;  [Ztt,  t  1(y;  Zt2,  yo)]} 
f? ]7J  T=t-  h(z  +l(;~? 
TI  t- 
T  ) 
T  *  . ..(23) 
where 
U(Zt-1  1 y,  yo)  =  DWi=f  H-  1  h[z,  I+fo(t  y  T 
(Of course,  It  should  be subscripted  by t -1.  This  is omitted  to simplify  the notation  which 
is already  somewhat  cumbersome.) 
Substituting  the expression  (23) in the right  side of (22) and using (1), we obtain 
U(I-py0,  Yo If0)+  Et  at  =  fI  U[l-Ptc(Y;  At)], WY(; it)  I  gt{f0;  [zt  ,  ct l(y;  At-]} 
R) 
X pl(zt-  y,  yo)dzt~ 
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as the expression  which  the consumer  wishes  to maximize  by his choice of yo and y.  To 
simplify  notation,  the above  expression  will often be written  simply  as 
U(I-  PyO, YO  If  )+  StD-2  tJ  U(I-pyt,  Yt  Ift)1i(ztI  I  y, yo)dztt.  ...(22') 
Rt 
This is clearly  equivalent  to the expression  being  maximized  in (5).  The reader  should 
be aware,  however,  that when  this simplified  notation  is used  Yt  is always  equal  to Ct(y;  it) 
andft  = gt{f?;  [zt-1,  t-1(y;  it-)]}. 
Define 
00 
0(y, o)  u(I-py,  cx+fly+s)h(e  I  O)ds. 
-oo0 
Then,  from (1) 
U(I-PY,  Y I  f)  =  Z - 14'(Y, fPA)f. 
Thus  by (3), (4) and the definition  of VT 
VT(f  0)  =  max  i' 
= 
n(o  if 
(yo,  y)  e co, I/p]  X  r 
+  =-  1  at  I  =  1  b(Yt,  f,)f(zt21  yv,  y0)dzt  i]  .. .(24) 
Rt 
It should be recalled that in (24) Yt =  t(y;  zt-  1, yo)  and 
ft  g{f0;  [zt-1,  t-t1(y  zt-2, yo)]},  for  t >  1. 
The above notation  can now be used to prove the following  lemma,  from which  the 
main theorem  can be proved  immediately. Again it should  be emphasized  that the proof 
does not depend  crucially  on the assumption  of a discrete  prior. 
Lemma 2.  If  VT(f)  is well defined, then there exists a decision set A and a function 
IIT:  .  .{#1  fl8} xA-+Rl  such  that 
VT(f)  =  max  E  -  T(fls  {  )fin  ... (25) 
~eA 
Proof.  Substitute  equation  (23) in (24) to obtain 
VT(f 0)  =  max  )Oi  -- nk(Yo,  I)f? 
(yo, y) e co, Ilp3 X r 
+  Et-1  bt  I =n 
0(yt,  fli)f  fiT  =t-  h(z  z  |  +iy)dzt]  ...  (26) 
where Yt =  Ct(y; it)  and y,  =  Cr(y; 4).  If we now let 
A =  [O, (I/p)] xF and  =(yo  y) 
we can define  1T by 
lT((,  fIh) =  [?t(YOx  pi)+  Et- X bt  f  (yt, Jh) HT  =t- 
h(zI  c +fliyY)dzt], 
where,  as above,  Yt =  Ct(y;  it) and  y, =  (y;  it).  Interchanging  the order  of summation 
and integration  in (26) then yields 
VT(f0)  =  max Ei  1qT('-, Ai)f?.  11 
TeA 
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Proof  of Theorem  1.  From (6) and (7) 
00 
HT(y, f)-  {  V'[g  1(f;  z, y)]m(z If;  y)dz.  ... (27) 
Suppose  y>y',  let k =  k(z I  fli, y) and k' =  k(z' i  i, y') then by Lemma  1, k is sufficient 
for k'.  Using Lemma  2, we may set V*(f)-='T-(f).  Then  by Theorem  3, if g, and g'1 
are defined  as in (19) and (20) then EV*{gj[f; (z, y)]} ?  EV*{gl(f; (z', y')]}.  Recalling 
that  m(z If; y)  E=  -  fih(z I  Pi, y) 
HT(yf)  EVT-l{gl[f;  (z,  y)]}  >  EVT  {g1[f;  (z', y')]}  =  HT(yt, 
Prescott  [13] proved  a similar  theorem  under  the assumption  of a normal  prior on,f. 
All of the results  proved  in this paper  can also be shown  to hold for any  prior  on f as long 
as VT(J)  is well defined. Lemma  3, which  follows,  uses the assumption  that the prior  on , 
is finite-discrete  to prove continuity  of HT(y,  f),  existence  of yT(f)  and well definition 
VT(J). This  is the only step  in any of the arguments  of this paper  in which  the discreteness 
assumption  is actually  used.  The argument  used to prove Lemma  3 can be employed  to 
prove  the same  results  when  the prior  probability  distribution  is concentrated  on a compact 
set of possible  /  values  and  when  the prior  is either  continuous  or discrete  with  mass  concen- 
trated on a countable  set.  The adaptations  required  in the proof are discussed  in the 
appendix. 
Lemma  3.  Letf* =  max  {fll fl2,  *2.  fl}  Assume  that 
Mo _  g  u(I,  + (fl*IIp)  + s)h(?  i 0)ds < oo. 
-  00 
Then HT(y, f)  is a  continuous  function of y for  all (y,f)  such that 0 < y ?  Ilp and 
f  =  (fi,  f2  a...,  fn),  with  0<fi < 1  for all i.  Further  yT(f)  exists and VT(f)  is well  defined. 
Proof. We prove  by induction  that,  when  T is finite,  HT(y, f)  is continuous  in y, yT(f) 
exists  and VT(,f)  is well defined. 
In the proof of Theorem  2, it was shown  that U(I-py,  y If) is a continuous  function 
of y.  Thus  y?(f) exists and V?(f)--  max  U(I  -  py,  y  If)  is well defined. By (5)-(7), 
0 S  y  (I/p) 
H1(y,  f)  V0[g1(f; z, y)]m(z  I  f;  y)dz.  ... (28) 
Since 0(y, ,B)  _  Mo, for all (y, /3), U(I-py,  y If)  <  MO,  for all y E [0, Ilp], and 
V?  [g 1(f;  z, y)] <_!  Mo 
Thus 
V?[gl(ff  z, z)]m(z If; y) < Mof(z),  ... (29) 
where 
fh(z I oc),  if  z ?  oc, 
I= I  if  a < z < x+(fl*Ilp), 
th(z I  + (fIl*IIp)), if  a + (f*I/p) < z. 
The  bounding  function  +(z) is shown  in Figure  1.  The right-hand  side of (29) integrates  to 
Mo(l + (1I/2r)(fl*I/p))  < o 
Therefore  (28) and the Lebesgue  dominated  convergence  theorem  imply that H'(y, f)  is 
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>  =  +J(z) 
>> =  h(zla) 
a  =  h(zla  +  giY) 
00  =  h  (zfc  +  e*  I) 
p~~~~~~ 
a  al+.8L y  a+*,8* 
FIGURE  1 
Suppose  now that HT(t,f) is continuous  in y.  We will now show that yT(f)  exists, 
that VT(f)  is well defined,  and that  HT+l  is continuous  in y.  From (6) and (7) 
H  T  (Y,  f)=-E VT[gl(f;  Z, y)].  ...(30) 
As HT(y, f)  is continuous in y, yT(f)  exists and VT(f)  is well defined by (8).  By Lemma 2, 
there  exists an 11T(fl,  {),  and A such that 
VT(f)  =  max  El=- 17T(fi  )  ... (31) 
c-  A 
It is immediate  that VT(f)  is a convex  function  off.  Hence  it is continuous  on open  convex 
sets.  Without loss of generality,  it can be assumed  that f  is in the open convex set 
3 =  [(g1,  ., g9):  gj>0,  --  1  gi =  1].  Our assumptions guarantee that the probability of 
gl(f;  z, y) E S is one.  So VT(.)  is continuous  at every  possible  posterior. Since  g1(f; z, y) 
is a continuous  function  of y and z, VT[gl(f;  z, y)] is also continuous  in y.  Now by (31) 
VT(f)  S?T-oM  M-rM  T. 
Therefore 
VT[g  (f;  Z, y)]m(z  I  f;  Y) <  MT1J/(Z)  .. .(32) 
The right-hand side of  (32) integrates to MT[l  + (1I  12t)1*(IIp)]  <cc.  The left-hand side is 
a continuous  function of y  and integrates  to  HT+  1(y, f).  Therefore  by the Lebesgue 
dominated  convergence  theorem  HT+ 1(y, f)  is a continuous  function of y for all (y,  f) 
such that 0 <  y  <  (Ilp) andf  in S.  11 
3. MONOPOLISTS  WHO EXPERIMENT  TO LEARN THEIR DEMAND CURVES: 
A REINTERPRETATION 
The statistical  model described  and the theorems  proved above can be reinterpreted  to 
analyse  experimental  behaviour  on the part of a monopolist  who does not know the slope 
of his demand  curve. In carrying  out this reinterpretation,  the monopolist  can be viewed 
as choosing  either  price or quantity. If price  is chosen,  a stochastic  demand  curve  deter- 
mines  the demand  which  that  price  calls  forth. When  quantity  is chosen,  the price  at which 
that quantity  can be sold is determined  by the stochastic  demand  curve. Interestingly,  the 
conclusions  obtained  in these two alternative  interpretations  appear  to be contradictory. 
But as we shall show these interpretations  are based  on different  statistical  models,  so the 
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First consider  the case where  quantity  is the decision  variable. Then  we let 
zt = price in period t, 
and 
Yt  = quantity in period t. 
The demand  curve  in period  t is 
zt-=cx+#Yt+  et,  * (33) 
where,  as above,  h(ct  I  0) is the density  of et. Also as above,  a is known  but the slope  of the 
demand  curve,  fi, is unknown. The firm's  beliefs about fi at time t are described  by the 
mass function  ft  which assigns  positive  probability  to elements  of a finite set {/3,  ..., fln}. 
In this case, all Pi are negative. (It should  be noted that this model has one unfortunate 
feature; the  demand  function  (33)  permits  negative  prices  to occur  with  positive  probability.) 
The firm's  profit  is, of course 
Ztyt -  C(Yt), 
where c is a cost function,  with c'>0  and c">0.  The firm is assumed  to maximize  the 
expected  utility  of profit. The utility  function,  i,  is assumed  to have Y'  >0 and  u"  <0. 
A firm  with horizon T can then be viewed  as choosing (yo, y) to maximize  (4) with 
UA[zty1-  c(yt)] replacing  u(I-pyt, zt) in the computation  of (4).  In this interpretation,  yo 
is the quantity  supplied  in period  0, and yt is a strategy  for choosing  the supply  level in 
period  t contingent  on the demand  experience  prior  to t. 
The non-experimenting  monopolist  chooses  Yt  to maximize 
r+ 
O(Yt  If 
t)=-  00 
l W[ytzt  -  c(yt)]m(zt I  ft;  yt)dzt.  ... (34 
This function  is strictly  concave  under  the assumptions  made about  Pi and c.  Thus if a 
solution  yO(ft)  exists,  it is unique. Since  the set  of possible  y levels  is [0, oo),  it is not compact 
and  the  continuity  of 0 does  not guarantee  the existence  of a maximum,  however. The same 
difficulty  frustrates  attempts  to prove Lemma  3 for this example. If, however,  yT(f)  and 
y0(f) exist, we can define 
(y,  ) = J  D[y(c+fly+s)-c(y)]h(c  I  O)de 
-00 
and apply  Lemma  2 to prove  Theorems  1 and  2.  Theorem  2 asserts  that  the experimenting 
monopolist  never chooses to supply less than the non-experimenting  monopolist. As a 
result,  the average  price,  cX  +flyT(f),  paid  to an experimenting  monopolist  will be lower  than 
a +,Byo(f),  the average  price  paid in markets  supplied  by a non-experimenting  monopolist. 
If price  is the decision  variable,  then 
zt  =  the demand  at time t, 
and 
Yt  =  the price  at time t. 
With  this reinterpretation,  the demand  curve  is (33).  Again  the set of f's which  occur  with 
positive  probability  is assumed  to contain only negative  numbers. In this case profit at 
time t is 
Ytzt  -  c(zt). 
As above, the utility  function,  Pi, is assumed  to be strictly  concave  and exhibit  a positive 
marginal  utility of income. The utility of profit used in computing  (4) is  [ytzt  -c(zt)], 
i.e. in (4)  U(I-py,  y I  g) is replaced  by {  a(yz -  c(z))m(z  I  g; y)dz.  The decision 
variable  yo is the price  chosen  in period  zero; yt is the pricing  strategy  for period  t, which 
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The expected utility function (34) maximized by the non-experimenting monopolist is 
now  computed  with  a[Yyz,-c(z,)]  replacing a[Zty,-c(yt)].  Again  the  strict concavity 
and convexity assumptions made about ti and c respectively, guarantee that (34) is strictly 
concave  and that y?(f)  is unique if it exists.  The existence question remains open.  If 
y?(f)  and yT(f)  exist, Lemma 2 and Theorems 1 and 2 imply y?(f)  <  yT(f).  Thus when 
price is the decision variable, the price charged by an experimenting monopolist is higher 
than that charged by a non-experimenter  with the same initial beliefs.  This contrasts with 
the situation that results when quantity is chosen.  In that case, the average price of an 
experimenter is lower than the average price charged when experimentation is absent. 
These apparently contradictory results are not  logically  inconsistent.  To  see why, 
consider the case in which z, is price and Yt  is output.  Note that the demand curve (33) can 
be transformed to obtain a demand curve 
Yt  zt +  .  ... (35) 
We have just  shown that (33) implies a higher average price with experimentation than 
without.  However, since the variance of (st/fl)  =  (I /f2), and /  is unknown, the demand 
curve (35) fails to satisfy the assumptions which led us to the conclusion that the experi- 
mental price exceeds the non-experimental price. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Uncertainty is pervasive, but it can be reduced at a cost.  Rather than assuming some 
ad-hoc cost of information we have modelled a process of endogenous information genera- 
tion.  The cost of information turns out to be the utility that must be foregone by the choice 
of a larger control variable than would be optimal given current information and ignoring 
experimentation.  This model provides a statistical foundation for the ad-hoc process which 
Arrow assumed and called " learning by doing ".  The model is also consistent with the 
empirical  observations  which  motivated  his  paper:  that  productivity  increases  with 
experience.  This happens in our model of the consumer because more informed consumers 
choose better combinations of risky drugs and non-risky goods for consumption. 
The model in this paper is one of intertemporal optimization for a consumer who takes 
prices as given.  Grossman [6]  and [7]  analysed a competitive equilibrium model  of  a 
market where firms are uncertain about the productivity of an input.  In the context of a 
rational expectations model he derived an algorithm which could be used to characterize 
the path of equilibrium price random variables as well as the optimal input policy for firms. 
An equilibrium  version of our model could similarly  be analysed using Grossman's approach. 
This is left for future work. 
APPENDIX 
The proof of Lemma 3 uses the assumption of a finite-discrete prior in two ways.  First, 
this assumption guarantees that the posterior distribution is an element of a finite dimen- 
sional simplex.  Thus the convex function VT has its domain in a finite dimensional space. 
Because its domain is finite dimensional, VT is easily shown to be a continuous function 
of / on open convex sets.  But continuity on open convex sets is a property which convex 
functions may not possess when they are defined on infinite dimensional sets.  If the prior 
on / is not discrete, then the domain of VT is indeed infinite dimensional and a more difficult 
proof is required to establish continuity.  This is done below under the assumption that 
the prior has compact support. 
The finite discreteness of the prior was also used to obtain equation (19), Bayes' Law, 
which implies that g1(f;  z, y) is a continuous function of y and z.  When the prior is either 
continuous or concentrated on a countable set, Bayes' Law can be expressed by an equation 
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We now establish the continuity of  VT under the assumption that the prior has its 
support on the compact interval [a, b]. 
Let M([a, b]) be the set of finite measures over the measure space defined by [a, b] 
and its Borel sets.  (A measure v on [a, b] is finite, if v([a, b]) < oo.)  This set includes but 
is larger than the set of probability measures over [a, b] and its Borel sets.  Using natural 
definitions of addition and vector multiplication and using the Prohorov-metric topology, 
i.e. the topology of weak convergence, M([a, b]) can be shown to be a convex topological 
vector  space.  (The  Prohorov  metric is  discussed in  Hildenbrand [8].  A  topological 
vector space is defined in Choquet [4].) 
The function VT can be defined on M[a,  b] by an expression analogous to (25).  Speci- 
fically, if v E M[a,  b], 
vY(V)  =  SUp f  fT(fl,  4)v(dfl)  ..  (A.1) 
The function VT is easily seen to be convex on M[a,  b].  The continuity of VT follows 
from the following proposition. 
Proposition.  If 
+o+o 
Mo=  u(I, ot  + (bI/p) + s)h(s  I  O)ds < oo,  ...  .(A.2) 
-  00 
then VT is continuous  on M[a,  b]. 
Proof.  Assumption (A.2) and the definition of  VT imply that for any K< oo,  VT(V) 
is bounded on the set of  v's for which v([a, b])<K.  Thus condition (iii) of Proposition 
19.9, p. 341 of Choquet [4], is satisfied, and this proposition implies that VT is continuous 
on M[a,  b].  11 
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